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Introduction
surcharges create incompatibility, although in slightly di¤erent ways. Because customers link their valuation of deposit accounts to the surcharging behavior of other banks owning ATMs in their local market, incompatibility of a given bank's card with other ATMs depends on the surcharges imposed by other banks. Following the literature on network economics, we expect incompatibility to change the relative importance of the complementary components in the system. Because incompatibility makes competitors'ATMs less accessible, it should reduce the strength of the relationship between them and deposit account pricing. It may also strengthen the link between own ATM density and deposit account pricing. The extent of these changes should depend on the degree of incompatibility. 4 We take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment to identify these e¤ects. Before 1996, the largest shared networks barred banks from imposing surcharges, while after 1996 they removed the ban and surcharges became widespread. 5 This represents a discrete move toward incompatibility.
There is also a certain amount of variation after 1996 in the degree to which surcharging is adopted.
Some banks adopt surcharging quickly, while others move more slowly. Finally, within the set of banks that surcharge we observe variation in the level of fees. While we include foreign fees in the analysis, they change little over our sample period, meaning that the post-1996 advent of surcharging provides the primary source of identi…cation in the data.
Our data consist of bank/year observations for a panel of banks competing in local markets across the United States from 1994-1999. For each bank, we observe its average deposit account fees, ATM deployment across its markets, and ATM fees. This allows us to identify the own ATM access granted to consumers by having a deposit account with that bank. We can further distinguish the in ‡uence of available competitors'ATMs by constructing a measure of the competitors'ATMs available to that bank's customers. We measure incompatibility for each bank using a measure of the surcharges imposed by competitors in its local markets.
Our empirical approach consists of estimating a set of hedonic regressions linking deposit account pricing to account characteristics and the availability of ATMs associated with the account. The hedonic regressions establish that both own and competitors'ATMs are positively related to deposit account prices. We also examine how incompatibility changes the relationships between component availability and deposit account pricing. Our …ndings are broadly consistent with the implications of theory. We …nd that incompatibility reduces the strength of the link between other banks' ATM availability and deposit account prices and increases the strength of the link between own 4 In the long run, this may also a¤ect equilibrium ATM deployment (supply) decisions, based on the indirect network e¤ect between demand for ATM cards and supply of ATMs. 5 Nine states overrode the ban prior to 1996; we account for this in the empirical work below. See Prager (2001) for an examination of this episode. One state (Iowa) maintained its ban after 1996, but our sample contains no data from banks in Iowa.
ATM availability and deposit account pricing. Our results are robust to di¤erent measures of incompatibility, ATM availability, and deposit account prices.
We also attempt to understand how travel costs a¤ect the relative importance of network e¤ects and incompatibility. We …nd that network e¤ects and the e¤ects of incompatibility are much stronger in markets with high population density. Because high population density increases travel costs, we interpret this as consistent with the notion that travel costs are an important determinant of the relationship between ATM services and deposit account pricing. Given the weakness of the results in low density markets, however, we also admit the possibility that our model is well-speci…ed for high-density markets but poorly speci…ed for low-density markets.
The …nal section of the paper broadens the interpretation of our results within the hedonic framework. It is well known that hedonic regressions should not be strictly interpreted as identifying utility parameters; rather, they should be viewed as reduced form relationships re ‡ecting the in ‡uence of other factors such as changes in costs and markups. We therefore present results from fuller speci…cations of the model that include independent variables capturing demand and supply e¤ects. Our primary results remain qualitatively similar, suggesting that shifts in observable supply and demand in ‡uences are not responsible for our results.
These results shed light on an aspect of network e¤ects-incompatibility-that previous work has found di¢ cult to examine empirically. There is a small literature taking incompatibility as given, generally seeking to establish the existence of network e¤ects. 6 Existing work on incompatibility is essentially limited to the study of competition between incompatible networks, and has employed fairly limited data on incompatibility. 7 Our work bene…ts from the ability to ob- 6 Examples of work taking incompatibility as given include Gandal, Greenstein and Salant (1999) , who study the link between operating system values and software availability in the early days of the microcomputer market. They …nd evidence supporting the existence of indirect network e¤ects. More recent work by Gandal, Kende and Rob (2002) tests for indirect network e¤ects in the adoption of Compact Disks (CDs) and CD players. Rysman (2000) provides evidence supporting the existence of complementary demand relationships in a two-sided platform market (Yellow pages). More recent work by Shankar and Bayus (2002) , Nair, Chintagunta and Dube (2003) and Karaca-Mandic (2003) applies structural econometric techniques to test for the existence of network e¤ects in markets where compatibility is …xed. 7 Gandal (1994 Gandal ( , 1995 and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (2001) …nd that computer spreadsheets compatible with the Lotus system commanded higher prices during the early 1990s. Our work di¤ers from this early work, in that it estimates the e¤ects of compatibility across di¤erent components of the network. It also di¤ers in that it primarily relies on within-…rm and within-market rather than cross-sectional variation in compatibility for identi…cation. More precisely, the analyses in Gandal (1994 Gandal ( , 1995 and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (2001) do not separate within-…rm from cross-sectional e¤ects of compatibility. The datasets are panels, but too small to allow the examination of within-…rm variation. In one other piece of work examining a di¤erent market, Greenstein (1994) …nds that mainframe buyers prefer to upgrade to compatible systems, a result suggesting that compatibility between past and future hardware is important.
serve within-market changes in incompatibility and a measure of incompatibility that is continuous rather than discrete, although in practice our identi…cation strategy relies on a fairly discrete shift toward incompatibility. Our work also adds to the existing empirical literature examining ATM markets. In general this literature does not focus on the indirect network e¤ects linking ATM cards and machines, although it does in some cases test hypotheses that relate to network e¤ects. 8 2 Deposit Accounts and ATM Services ATM cards are generally sold as part of the service bundle attached to a consumer's deposit account.
The deposit account is a checking account into which the customer deposits funds, and from which the customer withdraws funds periodically. 9 The standard deposit account agreement also o¤ers customers free access to the bank's own ATMs. ATMs allow bank customers to perform transactions electronically on their deposit accounts. Banks locate their ATMs "on-premise" at bank branches, and also "o¤-premise" at locations such as convenience stores, movie theaters, bars, and other locations where consumers typically need cash. In addition to deposit account services, banks o¤er savings account services and a wide variety of other …nancial services such as loans, brokerage and investment services and insurance. In principle, consumers can purchase these services from separate banks, and sometimes do.
While banks' strategic behavior is not the focus of our analysis here, it is worth highlighting the most important features of competition between banks. In the United States, approximately 10,000 commercial banks compete for deposit account customers in their local markets. 10 Smaller 8 Hannan, et al. (2002) examine banks'propensity to impose surcharges as a function of a variety of characteristics, although they do not explicitly link their analysis to deposit account pricing. Prager (2001) tests whether small banks lost market share in states that allowed surcharges prior to 1996; this is implicitly a test of whether incompatibility favored banks with high-quality ATM ‡eets, although she does not pose the question in those terms. Hannan and McDowell (1984a , 1984b ) explore the relationship between market concentration and ATM adoption. They …nd that markets in which large banks adopted ATMs became more concentrated during the 1980s, although they do not discuss their …nding in terms of network economics. Finally, Saloner and Shepard (1995) examine the di¤usion of ATMs from 1972-1979 and …nd that adoption occurred earliest for …rms with many branches and deposits, a result they interpret as consistent with the existence of indirect network e¤ects in demand. Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2003) estimate the welfare e¤ects of the increase in ATM deployment stemming from the surcharge ban, although their model does not incorporate network e¤ects. 9 During our sample most ATM cards began serving as debit cards. We do not directly model the link between these markets, although it appears that they are linked. The advent of surcharging in 1996, for example, appears to have spurred increased use of debit cards for purchases. Consumers' ability to substitute away from ATM use following the imposition of surcharges would attenuate the link between surcharging and willingness to pay for deposit accounts. Provided this substitution is not perfect, we would still expect to see an e¤ect of surcharging on willingness to pay for deposit accounts. 1 0 Our data omit observations for credit unions and thrifts. However, these institutions collectively hold only a banks often operate only within a small geographic area such as a county, in many cases using a single branch. The largest banks conduct operations in many states or even nationally, and can have thousands of branches and ATMs. Markets are typically assumed to exist at the county level, a convention that we adopt in our analysis in identifying banks' competitors. 11 There is considerable heterogeneity in market structure across regions, with rural markets typically being more concentrated than urban markets. Even within markets, there is considerable variation in banks'ATM strategies-some banks blanket their markets with ATMs, while others deploy them sparingly. As we will illustrate below, one of the most systematic di¤erences across banks regarding ATMs is that large banks deploy them more aggressively than small banks (relative to maintaining branches, for example). Another is that ATM deployment is largely concentrated in areas of high population density. We discuss the implications of this fact in some detail below.
Banks subscribe to "shared networks" that allow their customers to use other banks' ATMs.
In most cases access to these "foreign" ATMs is incomplete because it only allows consumers to withdraw cash; more complex transactions such as making deposits are not permitted through the shared network. The networks themselves are typically joint ventures formed by banks in order to share the …xed costs of interconnection infrastructure. Banks usually pay a …xed monthly or annual membership fee to the network. They also pay a "switch fee"for each transaction made by one of their customers on another bank's ATMs; the switch fee is roughly $0.40 on average during our sample, and does not vary signi…cantly across networks or regions. Part (on the order of $0.10) of the switch fee is paid to the network, and the remainder ‡ows to the ATM's owner in order to compensate it for providing services to a non-customer.
Bank customers therefore purchase from their home bank a bundle of services associated with the deposit account, including both an ATM card and unlimited access to that bank's ATMs.
These bundles are di¤erentiated both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal di¤erentiation primarily stems from geography; consumers strongly prefer banks with branches and ATMs that are conveniently located. 12 Services other than deposits provided by banks can confer both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation. These complementary services include savings and money market accounts, loans ranging from mortgages to credit cards, and brokerage services. Large banks are more small share of the deposit market. 1 1 Some work treats multi-county MSAs rather than individual counties as markets in urban areas-in our case, doing so makes no di¤erence empirically. This is due to our focus on within-market changes rather than cross-sectional di¤erences. Any di¤erences between the levels of variables measured at the county rather than MSA are likely to be constant for a given bank over time, and are swept out by bank …xed e¤ects. Recently, the question of whether banking markets have become less local has come to light (see Radecki [1998] for a discussion). While this may be true for products such as mortgages, it is unlikely to be true for consumers'ATM usage, which is necessarily local. likely to o¤er these services, although they become more widely available at banks of any size over our sample period. Vertical di¤erentiation also exists across features of the deposit account; banks vary in quality of customer service, for example. A good deal of vertical di¤erentiation stems from ATM availability; banks often use the size of their ATM ‡eet as a component of their marketing strategy.
For any given deposit account bundle, customers will also base their willingness to pay on the degree to which they can use other …rms' ATMs. This depends on both the availability of those ATMs in the local market, and on the compatibility between cards and other banks' machines.
Incompatibility in turn is a function of the fees imposed by other banks for such use. Because this relates so closely to the network literature on incompatibility, we now discuss that literature in order to motivate our empirical work.
Network E¤ects and Incompatibility
In recent years a wide-ranging theoretical literature has emerged examining the e¤ects of compatibility in markets with indirect network e¤ects. 13 Indirect network e¤ects are strong complementary relationships in demand between component products that consumers assemble into systems. In such settings there is a further distinction between components that are "hardware" and components that are "software." In such settings, "hardware" is the component of the system that is durable or otherwise incurs greater switching costs. In the case of ATMs, cards are hardware because they require the purchase of a subscription good-the deposit account-that carries switching costs.
Considering the institutional detail of the ATM market, the most relevant models are those in which integrated …rms sell both components of the system. 14 The most general result of these models is that holding prices constant, incompatibility (weakly) reduces consumers'willingness to pay. The strength of this e¤ect depends on the degree to which consumers want to "mix and match" components from di¤erent sellers. If demand for such transactions is zero, incompatibility leaves consumers unchanged, but if demand for mix and match transactions is high, incompatibility reduces aggregate willingness to pay. These e¤ects may vary by …rm; …rms with high demand for mix and match transactions will experience a larger reduction in willingness to pay. In our sample, we would expect this implication to be re ‡ected by a fall in prices as surcharging becomes prevalent, ceteris paribus. 15 A second result of the network literature is that incompatibility shifts the relative importance of components, because it moves consumers' purchase decisions from the component to the system level. With full compatibility, a customer may purchase components separately, but with incompatibility a customer chooses between bundled systems o¤ered by di¤erent sellers. In a hardware/software market, moving from component to system purchasing should therefore strengthen the empirical link between own software availability and hardware prices, and weaken the link between competitors'software availability and prices. In our setting, we can see this intuition by considering an environment with no ATM fees. In that case customers would value the only the total density of ATMs, without regard to their ownership. Once incompatibility exists, own ATMs become relatively more valuable than competitors'ATMs because competitors'ATMs are not fully compatible.
The fact that ATM and banking behavior involves travel is also important. Most models of ATM/banking competition portray consumers as facing travel costs to use ATMs. This in ‡uences, for example, the marginal decision regarding whether to use a close foreign ATM (which carries fees) or a more distant own ATM. This implication has a clear analogue in the hardware/software literature; in most theoretical models of hardware/software pricing, consumers …nd software availability valuable because it reduces the distance (in characteristic space) to their favorite software variety. While most theoretical models implicitly hold travel costs constant, in general we would expect that the implications discussed above would be stronger for consumers facing high travel costs. At zero travel costs, for example, consumers would never use a foreign ATM or pay fees as long as their home bank had one ATM somewhere. While quantifying travel costs is di¢ cult, it is widely accepted that areas with high population density have signi…cantly higher travel costs than non-dense rural areas. To account for this, in the empirical work below we present results for subsamples of high and low population density.
There are limitations to our approach. A …rst limitation is that it abstracts from the com- 1 5 This abstracts from the selection e¤ect that would lead customers with inherently high "mix and match"demand to migrate toward banks with large ATM ‡eets. Such a selection bias will reduce the estimated impact of surcharging. patibility choice at the …rm level. Firms clearly choose the level of incompatibility, meaning that it is jointly determined with other features of competitive equilibrium. In our case, the shift is plausibly exogenous for two reasons. First, …rms were barred from surcharging prior to 1996 by the by-laws of the largest networks. The advent of surcharging therefore represented the removal of a constraint, rather than an endogenous shift in strategic behavior. Second, we examine how surcharging by a …rm's competitors a¤ect its pricing, rather than how its own surcharging a¤ects its own pricing. Of course, in concentrated local banking markets such decisions are interrelated, but the relationship is less direct. A second limitation of our partial equilibrium approach is that it takes …rms'characteristics as given-most notably their software quality, as measured by the size of their ATM ‡eet. There is little question that the advent of surcharging changed the business model for ATM operations and accelerated the deployment of ATMs; this will become apparent when we discuss the descriptive statistics below. However, for our purposes the deployment decision is not the margin of interest. We are interested in measuring how changes in deployment a¤ect pricing for deposit accounts under both compatibility and incompatibility. Another limitation of our work is that while there is surely considerable consumer-level heterogeneity in willingness to pay, our data do not lend themselves to an examination of this heterogeneity. 16 Our approach is rather to estimate average e¤ects. While this could be a concern if the distribution of consumers with di¤erent characteristics changed across …rms based on the shift to incompatibility, we are unable to …nd evidence that this happened. 17 
Hedonic Speci…cations
A wide literature uses hedonic methods to estimate the relationship between product characteristics and prices. 18 The underlying hypothesis of the method is that products may be viewed as bundles of characteristics that are valuable to consumers. A hedonic regression attempts to uncover 1 6 We do attempt to handle some heterogeneity in the sample through our analysis of the relationship between population density and network e¤ects. However, we are unable to incorporate other consumer-level data. For example, one might imagine that income would a¤ect the importance of network e¤ects. There are no data at the market level, unfortunately, on income. (The Census publishes county/year level income data, but these are simply interpolated between the decennial census …gures.) 1 7 For example, we know that banks with high deposit balances/account will have lower price measures, because banks waive explicit deposit fees for customers with high balances. This would be a concern if the shift to surcharging caused the distribution of balances/account to shift across banks, because it would introduce a spurious correlation between surcharging and prices. In unreported results, we regress balances/account on our measure of incompatibility and …nd no relationship between them. 1 8 The pioneering work of Rosen (1974) is often cited as justi…cation for hedonic models measuring willingness to pay.
information about the marginal values of these characteristics to the typical consumer. The typical hedonic regression regresses price for product i at time t on a set of product characteristics X it and (possibly) a set of …xed e¤ects ( i ; t ):
This is also the approach taken in some other studies of compatibility. 19 A strict interpretation of the hedonic speci…cation is that the coe¢ cients represent willingness to pay (marginal value) attached to characteristics, while the i product dummies represent time-invariant price shifters.
If the and i coe¢ cients remain constant over time, one can also interpret the time dummies as the basis for constructing a price index. 20 As a general point (one that is true in any regression), the coe¢ cients will be biased by the omission of unobserved characteristics that are correlated with X it .
More formally, it has been well documented in recent years that in general the coe¢ cients will not re ‡ect underlying utility parameters, as is sometimes assumed in hedonic modeling. Rather, the coe¢ cients should be viewed as coming from a reduced form model capturing a combination of cost-and demand-based in ‡uences on prices, as well as any markups over marginal cost resulting from product di¤erentiation or oligopolistic behavior. 21 The literature focusing on this issue has identi…ed a set of assumptions under which the baseline hedonic regression above provides estimates of consumer willingness to pay. In particular, under perfect competition with linear or log-linear marginal costs, a hedonic regression will capture the contribution of each characteristic to marginal cost (and hence marginal value). 22 Under imperfect competition the hedonic coe¢ cients will represent marginal values only if the relationship between characteristics and utility follows particular functional forms. 23 However, it is unlikely that these assumptions hold in our data, for reasons we discuss below. Therefore, in section 5 below we present a variety of alternatives to the baseline hedonic model in order to assess the robustness of our results. We also attempt to be circumspect about interpreting our results as strictly measuring changes in willingness to pay.
Returning to the speci…cation above, in our case we estimate the relationship between prices for deposit accounts and characteristics of deposit account bundles. The unit of observation is 1 9 See, e.g., Gandal (1994).
2 0 See Triplett (1986). 2 1 See Triplett (1986, 1988) for early discussions of this point in the context of the confusion between "resource costs"
and "valuation." Pakes (2003) treats the issue more formally by constructing bounds on the relationship between reduced form coe¢ cients as compensating variation (i.e., willingness to pay). 2 2 This discussion follows Feenstra (1995) .
the bank/year level. Our measure of deposit account prices divides annual income associated with deposit accounts by year-end balances in these accounts:
This measure re ‡ects the annual price per dollar of deposit account balances. 24 The fee income measure includes revenue from monthly account fees, fees on bounced checks, per-check transaction charges, extra fees for returned checks, and in rare cases fees for the use of tellers'services. It also includes "foreign fee" revenue; we discuss the implications of this below. It does not include income from surcharges, as surcharge revenue is collected from non-customers and therefore falls into a separate revenue category. While this measure of prices is commonly used in the banking literature, a concern is that it may not fully re ‡ect the marginal prices that consumers pay for deposit accounts. In our case, this is less of a concern because we use price as the dependent variable; measurement error will therefore only bias our coe¢ cients of interest to the degree that it is correlated with our right-hand side variables. We also include bank …xed e¤ects, meaning that we require only that within-bank variation in this measure is correlated with within-bank variation in true marginal prices. Nonetheless, we estimate our model using a number of alternative price measures; our results are robust to the use of these alternative measures.
Characteristics include those associated with ATMs and those associated more generally with deposit accounts. Account characteristics include the number of branches per square mile owned by the bank in all of its local markets (counties), the number of employees per branch, and the average salary per employee. The last variable attempts to capture service quality, although it is also clearly correlated with average costs. To capture the possibility that consumers value obtaining banking services outside their home county, we also include the number of counties in which the bank operates. We also observe a number of bank-level characteristics that do not vary over time (or vary only slightly). These characteristics include whether the bank is a subsidiary of a large bank holding company, whether the bank o¤ers credit card, money market or brokerage accounts, and a dummy variable indicating whether the bank operates in multiple counties. While we can not include these characteristics in our hedonic regression because we also include bank …xed e¤ects, we use a two-stage procedure to estimate the relationship between these characteristics and prices. 25 Appendix B outlines this procedure and presents results, which we summarize below.
ATM characteristics include both the ATMs owned by bank i, and the ATMs owned by its competitors in the local markets in which it competes. Both types of ATMs should increase will- 2 4 See the Data Appendix for more detail on the construction of this variable. 2 5 As suggested by Chamberlain (1982) , we regress the estimated …xed e¤ects from the …rst stage on the …xed bank characteristics.
ingness to pay for the deposit account based on the indirect network e¤ect relating deposit accounts and ATMs. In the absence of ATM fees (incompatibility), all banks'ATMs might be equally valuable to consumers, although consumers may prefer their own banks' ATMs if they o¤er greater functionality (such as deposit-taking).
This implies that in the absence of incompatibility, prices should be related to bank characteristics, own ATM density and competitors'ATM density:
We measure density as ATMs per square mile over all counties in which the bank operates.
We use logs to re ‡ect the fact that each additional machine reduces the expected travel distance to use an ATM by a successively smaller amount. One issue with this speci…cation is that we have only partial data on competitors'ATMs. Our data source provides information regarding the ATM deployment of the largest 300 issuers in the United States; these issuers collectively hold a signi…cant majority of all ATMs during our sample period, but not all. In order to deal with this, we estimate the number of ATMs deployed by each bank's competitors for which we do not observe actual deployment. 26 We have used a variety of techniques for this estimation, an issue discussed in Knittel and Stango (2004) . 27 We outline the estimation procedure in Appendix B, and discuss its implications below.
Specifying Incompatibility
Incompatibility should change the relative (net) value of own and competitors' ATMs. It makes competitors'ATMs relatively less attractive by increasing the explicit costs associated with traveling to a competitors'ATM. It also makes own ATMs more relevant because on the margin, consumers will likely make more transactions at their bank's ATMs. We therefore allow incompatibility to a¤ect prices by interacting it with ATM density:
We also include the level of compatibility. While there is no clear theoretical justi…cation for doing so, it is possible that there are other changes in bank characteristics or consumer behavior that are correlated with the shift toward surcharging. Including the level of compatibility may control for such factors. We discuss this point more thoroughly in section 6.
We measure incompatibility in three ways. First, because the primary change in compatibility was discrete following elimination of the surcharge ban, we construct a dummy variable equal to one if the state in which a bank has primary operations allows surcharging. 28 This variable is equal to one for all observations after 1996. The second way we measure incompatibility is by estimating the average surcharge a consumer would pay for using another bank's ATM. This measure is:
The average surcharge is weighted, where the weights are the shares of total ATMs held by other banks in bank i's local market(s). The motivation for this speci…cation is an assumption that consumers know something about the distribution of ATMs and ATM fees in their local market, but do not have perfect knowledge regarding either speci…c fees at each ATM or the locations in which they will experience an unanticipated need for cash. 29 Because we possess surcharge data for only the largest ATM issuers in each market, constructing this average requires making an assumption about the surcharging behavior of smaller issuers. We outline these assumptions and discuss robustness in Appendix A; our results are quite robust to di¤erent assumptions about the behavior of smaller issuers.
We also construct an incompatibility measure that includes the bank's own foreign fees:
This measure has the advantage that both foreign fees and surcharges a¤ect the marginal degree of incompatibility between a card and competitors' ATM. However, the price measure includes foreign fee revenue, so using this measure will bias the coe¢ cient on incompatibility because higher fees per se lead to higher prices. This limits our ability to interpret these coe¢ cients. In practice, the results are quite similar using any measure of incompatibility, because nearly all of the variation in any incompatibility measure stems from the post-1996 regime change in surcharging.
Finally, while the largest networks barred surcharging prior to 1997, a number of states overrode the bans prior to 1997. While we do not observe the extent of surcharging in these states, we can identify their e¤ects through a dummy variable AllowSurch it . In some speci…cations below we also include this other measure. This is particularly useful given that most variation in incompatibility occurs discretely in 1997; the AllowSurch it variable provides a test against the hypothesis that the value of ATMs changed after 1996 due to some unobserved factor.
Econometric Issues
While these data are in principle very rich, we do face measurement issues in both our competitors'
fees and ATMs variables. The presence of measurement error will bring the estimated coe¢ cients toward zero, biasing against …nding an e¤ect of the ATM variables. 30 However, our empirical focus is more on testing whether there was a shift in the relationship between prices and ATM density following surcharging than on obtaining accurate point estimates of our coe¢ cients. In other work where we focus more on the latter concern, we implement a statistical correction for measurement error and undertake a variety of robustness checks of the technique. 31 A further econometric concern with our speci…cations above is endogeneity. We would expect that a bank's ATM density and deposit fees might be determined jointly as part of a bank's overall business strategy, or both a¤ected by unobservable variables. Branch density and our other banklevel characteristics might also be endogenous for similar reasons. If banks set fees strategically, we might also expect competitors' surcharging to be related to a bank's ATM density or deposit fees. It is di¢ cult to think of an appropriate (and large enough) set of instruments, although in other work we use higher moments of the observable variables as instruments with some success. 32 For the purposes of this paper, we view the joint changes in the observable variables as occurring because of the surcharge ban removal; this was a relatively exogenous event from the perspective of individual banks.
We also might expect that the coe¢ cient on competitors' ATMs would be biased negatively by the fact that competitors'ATMs increase both willingness to pay for own deposit accounts and willingness to pay for competitors'accounts. Thus, they may increase total willingness to pay for a given bank, but shift its residual demand curve inward because it increases willingness to pay for its competitors'accounts by more. For this reason, we view the coe¢ cients on competitors'ATMs as probably biased downward.
Finally, omitted variable bias may be a concern. There are two aspects to this. First, a concern might be that during our sample prices some factor other than ATMs or incompatibility is driving price changes. While this certainly might be true, it would have to be the case that the factor would be correlated both with within-bank changes in ATM density and within-bank price changes. Any common factor across banks leading to changes in prices would be controlled for by our …xed
year e¤ects. Furthermore, our identi…cation strategy relies on changes in the variables of interest rather than levels. So, for example, an unobserved factor leading banks with low ATM density to experience falling prices relative to banks with high ATM density would not drive our results (though this is true in the sample); in our speci…cation, identi…cation comes from the e¤ect of incompatibility on the relationship between changes in ATMs and changes in prices.
Second, while our focus is on the ATM market, during the time period of our analysis the availability of point-of-sale terminals for debit card use was growing rapidly. This is a concern, both because these terminals would a¤ect willingness to pay and because their deployment is generally viewed as having accelerated after 1996 as consumers increasingly used debit to avoid surcharges.
We explore this issue in related work, by including a variety of bank-level debit transaction measures in a structural model of deposit account demand. 33 We …nd no evidence that these measures bias our coe¢ cients of interest. Moreover, to the extent that incompatibility itself led to increased debit terminal availability and changed the level of prices, including the level of incompatibility in the speci…cation will control for terminal availability. In most cases we report median values for our data, because the data are highly skewed. One source of skewness is bank size; for example, while the median bank size (in deposits) is $326 million, the mean is $2. although this is a bit misleading; we show below that among banks whose ATM ‡eets grew rapidly, prices rose as well. Foreign fees remain roughly constant, while surcharges become quite prevalent between 1997 and 1999, which nearly doubles a customer's expected costs for using a foreign ATM.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Salary per employee and employees per branch remain essentially constant. The number of counties the typical bank operates in grows over time, re ‡ecting the cross-market consolidation that occurred in banking markets after their deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s. Table 2 presents the results of our hedonic regressions examining the relationship between incompatibility, bank/ATM characteristics and pricing. We show results from …ve speci…cations, one that omits incompatibility and four that include di¤erent measures of incompatibility. The results are quite robust to the measure of incompatibility.
Baseline Results
The results show strong support for the existence of indirect network e¤ects, both between deposit accounts and own ATMs, and also between deposit accounts and the complementary competitors'ATMs available in the local market. We …nd that own ATMs and competitors'ATMs are positively associated with deposit account prices. The own ATMs coe¢ cient is statistically significant in all speci…cations but that in Model 2. The competitors' ATMs coe¢ cient, on the other hand, is signi…cant only in Model 2 (though it is nearly so in columns 4 and 5, and the variables are jointly signi…cant in every speci…cation). It is possible that the competitors'ATM coe¢ cient is biased downward due to the e¤ects of competition, as we noted in the econometric issues section above.
While in some cases the coe¢ cient on competitors' ATMs is larger than that on own ATMs, this does not imply that competitors' ATMs are more strongly linked to prices than own ATMs.
The ATM variables are in logs and the mean of competitors' ATMs is signi…cantly higher than that for own ATMs, meaning that an increase of one ATM leads to a much smaller change in ln(competitors' AT M s) than in ln(AT M s). In every speci…cation, adding one own ATM has a larger e¤ect on price than adding one competitors' ATM. The magnitude of the results suggests that doubling the total number of ATMs available in the local market is associated with deposit account prices roughly 5-10 percent higher. While this is not an enormous e¤ect in economic terms, it is perhaps best interpreted as a lower bound given the measurement error inherent in our measure of competitors'ATMs. And, for some banks we observe increases of 300 percent in ATM density over the sample period.
We also …nd signi…cant evidence that incompatibility changes the relative importance of own and competitors'ATMs. Model 2 through 5 include the density/incompatibility interaction terms.
In each case, the results suggest that incompatibility strengthens the relationship between own ATMs and deposit account prices, and weakens the relationship between competitors'ATMs and account prices. The results are robust to the incompatibility measure; furthermore, the pre-1996 incompatibility coe¢ cients have similar signs, although they are not statistically signi…cant. This provides weak evidence against the hypothesis that some other regime change occurred in 1996 that changed the relative importance of own and competitors'ATMs.
The sizes of the coe¢ cients on the incompatibility measures suggests that at an expected competitors' surcharge of $0.60, competitors' ATMs essentially have no relationship with deposit account prices. While the sum of the coe¢ cients does not change much after 1996 because the shifts in own and competitors'coe¢ cients nearly o¤set each other, the relative importance of ATMs increases after 1996. Adding one own and one competitors' ATM to the market after 1996 a¤ects prices more strongly, because more "weight" is on the component that is changing by more in percentage terms.
The coe¢ cient on the level of incompatibility is negative and signi…cant in the speci…cation that uses expected foreign ATM cost as the measure of incompatibility, and positive in the speci…cation that uses competitors' surcharges as the measure of incompatibility. It is di¢ cult to attach any one interpretation to these coe¢ cients, as they may measure the in ‡uence of any omitted variables that are correlated with incompatibility. The fact that the foreign cost coe¢ cient is more negative than the surcharge coe¢ cient does make sense, however. Foreign fees should reduce willingness to pay, and may have a stronger e¤ect than surcharges in doing so.
While we do not discuss them in detail, the other coe¢ cients show an intuitive relationship between bank characteristics and prices. 34 In most speci…cations branch density, salary per employee and employees per branch are positively related to prices, although only the coe¢ cients on employees per branch are statistically signi…cant. The results suggest that there is essentially no systematic relationship between geographic breadth (as measured by number of counties) and
prices. Referring to the results in Appendix B, we also …nd a positive relationship between price and whether the bank is a member of a bank holding company, operates in multiple counties, and o¤ers brokerage services.
6 Alternative Speci…cations
Capturing the Demand for "Mix and Match" Transactions
The speci…cations above pool the data, e¤ectively assuming that the hedonic relationship is identical across the range of markets and …rms for which we observe data. Within the context of classic hedonic modeling, it assumes that the value that consumers attach to mix and match transactions is constant across markets (assuming that our coe¢ cients re ‡ect this marginal value). Most models of ATM usage view consumers'valuation of ATM access as dependent on the travel costs they face. 35 This implies that the network e¤ects associated with ATMs and the e¤ects of incompatibility should depend on travel costs. In order to explore this possibility, we stratify our sample by the population density of banks' local markets, under the assumption that population density is correlated with travel costs. Table 3 presents summary data for our sample strati…ed in two ways. First, we separate banks into those operating in areas of high population density from those operating in areas of low population density. We also separate large and small banks, based on local ATM share. We categorize as "high density"any bank operating in areas with an average population density above the sample median, and the remainder as operating in "low density" areas. 36 We further segment these subsamples, treating as "large" any bank in the subsample with a share of the local ATM market larger than the median (for that subsample).
These data show a clear pattern, that is not only informative regarding the travel cost story but also sheds light on variation in the data that identi…es our earlier results. The greatest changes following the advent of surcharging occurred by large banks in dense areas. The most dramatic changes are in ATM density, which doubles for large high-density banks but is unchanged for smaller high-density banks. This is associated with equally dramatic changes in prices. Large banks charge signi…cantly higher ATM fees. They also charge higher deposit fees. More importantly, this deposit fee gap grows signi…cantly after the advent of surcharging, from $0.60 in 1995 to $1.66 in 1999.
There is little evidence of such change in low density areas. While there are di¤erences between large and small banks, they are not nearly so dramatic. Nor do they change very much after the advent of surcharging. Table 4 presents results from our hedonic models for subsamples based on density. The di¤erence is striking. In the high-density subsamples, the relationship between ATMs and deposit prices is extremely strong, while in the low-density subsamples the relationships are essentially nonexistent.
The strength of the indirect network e¤ect associated with own ATM density essentially triples, while the e¤ect of incompatibility strengthens the network e¤ect in high density markets. This is consistent with a view that travel costs increase the network e¤ects between deposit accounts and ATM access, and also increase the importance of compatibility between accounts and own ATMs.
The indirect network e¤ect associated with competitors'ATMs is positive and nearly signi…cant in high density markets. In stark contrast, there is a negative correlation in low density markets
While it seems sensible that the results should be stronger in high-density markets, it does seem a bit surprising that the results are nonexistent in low-density markets. While one possibility is simply that travel costs are low enough to render ATMs (and by extension incompatibility) irrelevant, another possibility is simply that our model is well-speci…ed for high-density markets and poorly speci…ed for low-density markets. Our functional form may describe high-density markets more accurately, for example. Evidence in favor of this comes from the other coe¢ cients. Branch density, for example, is positively and signi…cantly related to prices in high-density markets but not in low-density markets; our priors tell us that branches would be relatively more important in markets where consumers do not value ATMs (though this is only a conjecture). Similarly, ln(number of counties) is positively related to prices in high-density markets-a result we …nd intuitive-but negatively related to prices in low-density markets. This pattern seems to suggest that speci…cation error may be a problem in low-density markets. Given this inconclusive evidence, we interpret our results as …nding strong evidence for the existence of network e¤ects and an economically relevant relationship between incompatibility and pricing in high-density markets, while in low-density markets we are unsure whether our (non-)results re ‡ect lower travel costs or speci…cation error for these markets.
More Flexible Speci…cations
While the hedonic speci…cations above are informative, it is risky to interpret the coe¢ cients as purely re ‡ecting consumer tastes. 37 Pakes (2003) notes that generally we should view a hedonic relationship between prices and product characteristics as a reduced form speci…cation of a richer model in which "the hedonic function is the expectation of marginal costs plus that of the markup conditional on 'own-product' characteristics." Feenstra (1995) goes beyond this general point to explicitly model the exact relationship between prices, costs, markups and characteristics for particular functional forms of costs and utility. He notes that if …rms have log-linear marginal costs, we can represent the relationship between prices and product characteristics (with slight changes in notation) as:
where the terms capture shifts in marginal cost, and for simplicity we include in the X vector both deposit account characteristics and the ATM-and incompatibility-related variables. The term (ln p it ln c it ) represents the markup of price over marginal cost. If this markup is non-zero and correlated with any variables in X, the coe¢ cients will be biased.
In our case, we certainly expect markups over marginal cost to be positive, as pricing for deposit accounts takes the form of a two-part tari¤ and we are essentially measuring average prices. There is also considerable evidence that banks possess short-run market power (leaving aside the question of whether they earn supercompetitive returns in either the short or long run). The concern in our case is that markups are correlated either with incompatibility, or with other variables in X.
A simple speci…cation capturing this possibility is one that models the unobserved markup as a function of incompatibility, i.e.:
In this speci…cation, markups are composed of a constant term and a term that varies with incompatibility, suggesting the following speci…cation:
In this case the constant markup 1 is absorbed into the constant term (or …xed e¤ects), while the coe¢ cient 2 measures the e¤ect of incompatibility on markups. This speci…cation is in fact the one estimated in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 . In those results we …nd that the coe¢ cient on incompatibility is negative when foreign fees are included in incompatibility, and positive when only surcharges are included in incompatibility. This makes it di¢ cult to attach a single interpretation to this (admittedly restrictive) model.
More broadly, Pakes (2003) notes that markups conditional on product characteristics may be a complex function of product characteristics as well as factors a¤ecting the equilibrium point elasticity of demand, such as factors shifting costs and residual demand. 38 Given our data, we are unable to separate the e¤ects of ATM-related variables on willingness to pay from their e¤ect on markups. However, we can employ a richer speci…cation including cost-and demand-related variables, in an attempt to mitigate any bias introduced by correlation between these factors and our variables of interest. We therefore construct the following speci…cation: 
We include three variables in Z it : the ratio of noninterest expenses to assets for the bank, its net interest margin on all of its loans, and the average savings rate on its deposits. 39 Each of these variables are measured in percentage points. 40 While the noninterest expense ratio may include both …xed and variable costs, it may be correlated with marginal cost. The interpretations of the net interest margin and savings rate are less clear, as they likely measure components of both costs and willingness to pay. The savings rate, for example, represents both an opportunity cost of funds for the bank (a¤ecting its costs) and for consumers (a¤ecting their substitution between checking and savings accounts). The net interest margin operates similarly. Thus, we remain agnostic about the expected signs of these coe¢ cients. To explore the possibility that incompatibility a¤ected the in ‡uence of these variables on markups, we also estimate a speci…cation that interacts them with incompatibility:
ln (p it ) = X it + 1 ln(OwnDens it ) + 2 ln(CompDens it ) + 3 ln(OwnDens it )Incompat it + 4 ln(CompDens it )Incompat it Table 3 presents results from these three speci…cations. All speci…cations use the expected level of competitors'surcharges as a measure of incompatibility. The most salient aspect of the results is that in all three speci…cation, the inclusion of the richer set of controls leaves our qualitative results regarding indirect network e¤ects and incompatibility unchanged. In every speci…cation the signs of the coe¢ cients are identical to those in the earlier results. The coe¢ cients on own and competitors'ATMs are estimated less precisely, but as we discuss below, this may be an artifact of the fact that we are grouping high and low population density markets together; when we separate the two, the coe¢ cients on own and competitors' ATMs become more positive and statistically signi…cant (for high density markets). The incompatibility terms remain statistically signi…cant. 3 9 We obtain these variables from the Call Reports. All variables are annualized. Noninterest expenses are yearly expenses divided by total assets. The net interest margin is aggregate loan income minus aggregate loan losses divided by total loan balances, all measured in dollars. The savings rate is total interest expense on savings accounts divided by total savings balances, all measured in dollars. 4 0 The sample means for the noninterest expense ratio, the net interest margin and the savings rate are 1.63%, 1.21% and 2.58% respectively.
This suggests that our empirical results accurately re ‡ect the existence of indirect network e¤ects and the e¤ect of incompatibility.
The coe¢ cient on the level of incompatibility varies in magnitude, but is positive and highly signi…cant in every speci…cation. Again, it is di¢ cult to interpret the coe¢ cient as strictly measuring changes in markups. One interpretation of this result is that incompatibility relaxes price competition by strengthening horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation. Without ATM fees of any sort, ATM ‡eet size is not a source of horizontal or vertical product di¤erentiation. As fees rise, consumers living or working near a bank's ATMs will …nd that bank's deposit account more attractive because it allows them to avoid surcharges; this increases horizontal di¤erentiation.
Furthermore, as incompatibility increases banks with large ATM ‡eets become relatively more attractive to all customers who use ATMs. 41 Another interpretation is that incompatibility led to other changes in omitted variables (such as debit terminal availability) that are positively correlated with prices.
The cost/demand variables are statistically and economically signi…cant, although the terms interacting them with incompatibility are not (with the exception of that on the savings rate). The noninterest expense ratio is positively related to prices, as expected. An increase in the ratio of one standard deviation (within-…rm) is associated with a price approximately 10% higher. The net interest margin is positively related to prices. This is a bit puzzling, as it seems inconsistent with a cost-based explanation if loan rates re ‡ect the marginal return on dollars held in deposit accounts, and inconsistent with a demand side explanation, as higher loan rates make complementary deposit accounts less attractive to consumers. It may be correlated with an unobserved cost shifter that which would make both loan rates and deposit account prices higher. Finally, the savings rate is positive and statistically signi…cant. A one standard deviation increase in the savings rate is associated with a three percent increase in deposit account prices. This may re ‡ect a complementarity in demand across savings and checking accounts, or could re ‡ect the fact that higher savings rates increase banks'cost of funds.
In concert, these results suggest that our baseline speci…cations accurately re ‡ect the impact of network e¤ects and incompatibility. While it is di¢ cult to place too much weight on any particular interpretation of the results for the new variables, it is encouraging that the baseline results are stable to their inclusion. This is particularly true for the last speci…cation, which includes both the level of incompatibility and a full set of incompatibility interactions. While we do not interpret the coe¢ cients as representing the primitives of the utility function, it seems unlikely that our main results are simply driven by spurious correlation between our variables of interest and some other factor.
Alternative Measures of Price
Because our measure of prices is somewhat aggregate and rough, we explore the robustness of our results to alternative measures of price; results of the baseline model using alternative measures of price are shown in Table 6 . One speci…cation estimates the model using the level of prices rather than the log. A second speci…cation uses total accounts rather than total deposits in the denominator, and a third uses the level of the account-based price rather than the log. Finally, our …nal alternative speci…cation uses the price measure de…ned above, but also includes the share of total deposits held in checking accounts and the level of deposits per account as right-hand side variables. This controls for a number of issues. First, within-bank variation in the share of deposits held in checking accounts would change measured prices, which would be a concern if such variation were correlated with our right-hand side variables of interest. Second, withinbank variation in deposits per account might a¤ect measured prices if banks waive deposit fees for customers with high balances per account. Again, this would be a concern if such variation were correlated with our variables of interest. However, as the results in Table 6 indicate our results are quite robust to the price measure that we use.
Conclusion
We set out in this paper to test whether a hedonic model can uncover economically signi…cant indirect network e¤ects. We also test whether changes in the compatibility of components in a network system a¤ect prices in a material way. For high-density, primarily urban markets, we …nd strong evidence of these links between bank deposit accounts and ATMs. One novelty of our result is that we …nd signi…cant relationships between a bank's deposit accounts and the density of ATMs deployed by its competitors in the local market. In the context of the network economics literature, this represents a link between hardware pricing and the availability of competitors'software.
We also …nd that the incompatibility of these machines with deposit accounts-as measured by ATM surcharges-is associated with deposit account price movements. This pattern of results suggests that the interplay between compatibility and pricing is important, and that links between pricing and quality for di¤erent products linked by indirect network e¤ects can be quite strong.
This is particularly useful to know since some previous studies of network markets have examined only one component.
A Data Appendix: Sources and Variable Construction

A.1 Primary Data Sources
We take our data from four principal sources. We supplement the above with data from the FDIC Summary of Deposits Database (SOD).
The SOD lists the location of branches for every bank and thrift in the country. It also lists the deposits held at each branch. It does not contain data on branch location for credit unions. We assume that each credit union has one branch, located in its home county, and that all of that credit union's deposits are held at that branch. This assumption is unlikely to a¤ect our results.
SOD data are collected each June.
A.2 An Observation in Our Data
By cross-referencing the data sets above, we obtain observations at the issuer level describing each issuer's balance sheet activity and ATM activity. We also use the geographic data from the SOD to derive information about the market(s) in which the issuer competes. Because the data are measured at di¤erent times, we must establish a concordance between the dates in the di¤erent data sets. We establish the concordance based on the fact that our analysis includes deposit prices as LHS variables, and ATM-related variables as RHS variables. While these may be jointly determined, to mitigate the endogeneity problem we match ATM-related data for each January with six-month ahead data from the other data sets. Thus an observation from 1994 contains ATM-related data from January 1994, while all other data are from June 1994. We describe these data below.
A.2.1 Pricing for Accounts and ATMs
For each issuer, we observe its income associated with deposit accounts over the year preceding the observation date. The primary component of such income is income from monthly service charges on deposit accounts. It also includes foreign fee income paid by its customers stemming from the use of other issuers' ATMs. It also includes a variety of other fees such as NSF fees for bounced checks and other penalty fees on deposit accounts. If the issuer is a bank holding company, we sum its deposit fee income for all banks in the holding company.
To develop our measure of prices, we divide income on deposit accounts by the end-of-year dollar value of deposits (in thousands). This price measure therefore represents the average fees paid per dollar of deposits. This measure omits the additional opportunity cost of holding deposits in checking, which is the forgone savings interest income. However, it is likely that the measurement error associated with omitting this component of "prices"is similar across banks, and within banks over time. 42 Another issue associated with using this price measure is that banks typically o¤er consumers account options with lower explicit fees in exchange for maintaining higher minimum balances. If banks di¤er systematically in the composition of their customer bases, we will understate fees at banks with high deposits per customer (assuming those customers sort into accounts designed for them).
A practical di¢ culty with using this measure of fees is that the numerator is a ‡ow measure over the previous year, while the denominator is a stock measure at end-of-year. This creates measurement error for banks with large deposit acquisitions or divestitures during the year. Indeed, there are a signi…cant number of observations with implausibly small or large fee measures. To check that these were outliers stemming from measurement error, we measured the year-to-year percentage change in deposits for observations with exceedingly small or high fee measures; we found that in most cases such observations were for banks that experienced extremely large changes in deposits (more than …fty percent in absolute value). We drop these observations. In unreported speci…cations we also include these observations but truncate the fee variable at "reasonable"values, with little di¤erence in the qualitative results.
For each issuer in the Card Industry Directory, we also observe its foreign ATM fee and surcharge at the beginning of the year for the observation. In some cases, the bank lists a range for these fees. In that case, we use the highest fee reported. In the empirical work, this tends to understate the true relationship between fees and our other variables of interest.
A.2.2 Branch-and ATM-Related Variables
For each issuer, we observe its total deposits, ATMs and branches. We also observe the distribution of its deposits and branches across individual counties. Obtaining data on county size in square miles allows us to calculate the density of branches/ATMs per square mile within each county.
For banks operating in multiple counties, we calculate the average number of branches and ATMs across all counties in which the bank operates.
In order to construct competitors'ATMs, we estimate the total number of competitors'ATMs in each county. We do this by estimating a within-sample regression of ATMs on branches, year dummies and year/branch interaction terms. To control for the fact that larger FIs have a greater ratio of ATMs to branches, we also interact the branch variables with the log of issuer size (in deposits). We then construct …tted values of ATMs for each FI for which we do not have ATM data. In order to check the sensibility of this procedure, we compared the …tted total number of ATMs from this procedure to aggregate data on ATM deployment. The …gures match fairly closely.
We also conduct in Knittel Values are medians for ATM-and branch-related variables, means for all others. Surcharge: large bank, high density n/a n/a n/a 0.82 1.11 1.18 small bank, high density n/a n/a n/a 0.47 0.95 0.91 large bank, low density n/a n/a n/a 0.92 1.27 1.25 small bank, low density n/a n/a n/a 0.84 1.10 1.05 Notes: High and low density are above and below sample median.
Large/small banks are those above/below median deposit market share for density subsample. All speci…cations include …xed year and bank e¤ects.
Model uses competitors'surcharges to measure incompatibility.
Models (1) and (3) use observations from high-density markets.
Models (2) and (4) use observations from low-density markets. All speci…cations include …xed year and bank e¤ects.
Model uses competitors'surcharges to measure incompatibility. Baseline uses speci…cation from column 1, Table 4 .
Model 1 includes deposits per account and % of total deposits in checking accounts on RHS.
Model 2 uses level (not log) of deposit fees as price.
Model 3 uses ln(fee income per account) as price.
Model 4 uses level of fee income per account as price. 
